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Abstract. Supply chains have become the major and dominant paradigm of business and 
competition. The main challenge is how to act in multi-echelon supply chains considering 
the levels involved. Making a choice independently or integrating with some or all levels 
will be a critical decision, and therefore affects the overall profit of the chain. This article 
proposes a non-cooperative game theory approach to helping in making a better deci-
sion in the supply chain and gaining the most accessible benefit. Our research considers 
unlimited three-echelon supply chains with S suppliers, M manufacturers and K retailers. 
The Nash equilibrium and definition are used bearing in mind inventory and pricing and 
marketing cost as decision variables for this matter. This paper studies a three-echelon 
supply chain network and focuses on the value of integrating a pair of partners in the 
chain. In the decentralized case, the supplier sets its own price, the manufacturer points 
out order quantity, wholesale price and backorder quantity, and the retailer charges the 
final retail price of the product and marketing product. Though there are multiple players 
at a single echelon level, each manufacturer supplies only a specific product to a given re-
tailer. In addition to the decentralized case, two integration scenarios have been taken into 
account: manufacturer-retailer and supplier-manufacturer. As for manufacturer-retailer in-
tegration, inventory/holding cost issues diminish to a single warehouse and the retailer 
does not have to enforce marketing effort any more. Supplier-manufacturer integration 
brings similar benefits. Under each scenario, all parties involved simultaneously set their 
strategies. Through a numerical experiment, 17 design cases (through designing experi-
ments) have been developed and the total profit of the supply chain under each scenario 
has been evaluated. Statistical tests on the above introduced 17 experiments have found 
that the decentralized system performs significantly worse than the integration of the sup-
plier with the manufacturer, whereas no significant difference can be observed regarding 
other combinations. 
Keywords: supply chain, coalition, non-cooperative games, Nash equilibrium, design of 
experiment, Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm.
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Introduction
More than 50 years ago, Forrester (1958) introduced the elements of a theory that to-
day is called supply chain management (SCM). The concept of the supply chain means 
that many experts believe that competition is transferred from companies to chains. 
SCM is extensive enough, and therefore large international corporations such as Cisco, 
Dell Computer, Gillette, Kodak, LEGO, Motorola, Sony, 3M, Xerox and Wal-Mart 
implemented it in the past decade. Moreover, international consultancy firms like IDM 
business Consulting Services, A.T. Kearney, Cap Gemini, etc. have adopted SCM as 
an important business area. Also, a large number of universities and business schools 
have included SCM courses in their curricula. Many scholars and experts gave different 
definitions for SCM that depend on their viewpoints and attitudes (Walker 2005). The 
role and importance of supply chain management have faced a number of challenges 
and problems. Although a comprehensive model dealing with the issues of the supply 
chain has not been explained, we have to indicate that questions such as reviewing the 
theoretical foundations of information systems, marketing, financial management, lo-
gistical and organizational relations have been considered by many researchers (Wang 
et al. 2007). There are many challenges that latent in the concept of the supply chain. 
The decisions made in SCM are mainly about the flows between chain stages. There-
fore, many scholars express challenges and problems, and SCM have tried to answer 
them (Chandra, Kamrani 2004; Chopra, Miendel 2007; Simchi-Levi et al. 2004; Wisner 
et al. 2008). The objective of supply chain management is to improve various activi-
ties and components to increase the overall benefits of the supply chain system. Many 
decisions are made at a different level of the supply chain, which includes detailed and 
strategic decisions. Planning important decisions in a multi-echelon supply chain will 
affect all levels and the SC as a whole (Stadtler, Kilger 2007). If each level of the supply 
chain makes their inventory, the decision on pricing and advertising without considering 
other levels as well as the bullwhip effect will occur and the advantage of supply chain 
competiveness decrease (Lee et al. 1997). Between the components and different levels 
of the supply chain, in order to achieve the overall objectives, many contradictions may 
occur, including that these disorders, over time, may result in the decreased strength and 
competitiveness of the supply chain. Such conflicts, like marketing costs (advertising), 
pricing and inventory decisions can occur during the life cycle of the supply chain. For 
avoiding such loss in the SC, many coordination mechanisms have been introduced in 
recent researches. There are many possible interactive coordination mechanisms that can 
occur between different levels (Esmaeili et al. 2008). A large part of these mechanisms 
are based on a game theory approach. The game theory is concerned with the actions of 
decision makers who are conscious that their actions affect each other. The game theory 
approach is an appropriate tool for collaboration in the supply chain.   
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Beside contradiction with decision variables, different levels of the supply chain may 
decide on acting independently or, in some cases, trying to integrate with some other 
levels for gaining more advantages. In this case, the main challenge is how to act in 
multi-echelon supply chains taking into account the levels involved. Making a choice 
independently or integrating with some or all levels will be a critical decision, and 
therefore affects the overall profit of the chain. This decision will have an influence on 
prices, inventory, lot sizes and costs which will finally change the overall profit of the 
supply chain. For solving this problem and finding a suitable answer, a three-echelon 
unlimited supply chain with S suppliers, M manufacturers and K retailers has been 
considered. In addition, decisions on pricing, inventory and advertising are included 
as three main decision variables in the proposed models. By using the definition of 
the Nash equilibrium for continuous problems, the best responses for each level of the 
supply chain in decentralization and integration situations are identified and used in a 
simulated supply chain. By comparing the obtained results, the best decisions are illus-
trated. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, supply chain manage-
ment, the game theory and the Nash equilibrium are introduced and the classification 
of researches on similar topics is illustrated. Next, the assumptions and notations of our 
proposed models are presented and the payoff functions of each player in all situations 
(integration or decentralization) are designed. After, the best response of each player is 
calculated. Finally, by using the proposed models in the simulated SC, the results are 
compared and the final conclusion is proposed.  
1. Literature review
This section includes the basics and concepts of the game theory, different types of 
coordination contracts and reviews similar researches. As a definition, the supply chain 
consists of all parties involved, directly, or indirectly, in fulfilling a customer request 
(Chopra, Meindel 2007) and mentioning all activities performed until a raw material 
is delivered as the final good to a customer (Gumus, Guneri 2007). These activities 
and functions include new product development, marketing, operations, distributions, 
financing and customer services. A typical supply chain may involve a variety of stages 
such as customers, retailers, wholesalers, distributors, manufacturers and raw material 
suppliers (Chopra, Meindel 2007). Between the components and different levels of the 
supply chain, in order to achieve the overall objectives, many contradictions may oc-
cur, the contradictions that these disorders take place over time result in the decreased 
strength and competitiveness of the supply chain. One of the main tools for solving the 
problem in the before mentioned situation are the game theory approach. The essential 
elements of the game are players, actions, payoffs and information (Chen 2009). These 
are collectively known as the rules of the game, and the objective of the modeller is to 
describe the situation in terms of the rules of the game so as to explain what will happen 
in that situation. Trying to maximize their payoffs, the players will devise plans known 
as strategies that pick actions depending on the information that has arrived at each 
moment. The combination of strategies chosen by each player is known as equilibrium 
while given which modeller can see what actions come out of the conjunction of all 
players’ plans, which tells him the outcome of the game.
H. Amoozad Mahdiraji et al. Coalition or decentralization: a game-theoretic analysis of a three-echelon...
463
While information transaction is not possible between different players (different layers 
of the SC), in such situations and by considering the Nash definition, each player will 
stimulate competitor believes or best responses, and, when these believes are correct, 
the Nash equilibrium will occur (Osborne 2004). In the given two-player game, the best 
responses are defined as (1):
 { }
* * * * *
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1( ) : ( , ) ( , ) ; iB S S U S S U S S s S= > ∀ ∈ ,
 { }
* * * * *
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2( ) : ( , ) ( , ) ; iB S S U S S U S S s S= > ∀ ∈ ,
 { }
'( ) : ( , ) ( , ) ; ,i i i i i i i i i i iB S S U S S U S S s S− − −= > ∀ ∈  (1)
where Bi stands for the best response for player i, (Si, S–i) – for the strategy chosen by 
player i & –i, (i,–i) – for two players of the game, * *( , )i iS S−  – for the best strategies 
for players, Ui (Si, S–i) – for utility or payoff when players choose (Si, S–i) as their final 
decisions. By considering the definition of the best response and continuous and discrete 
payoff functions, the Nash equilibrium is computable by the derivation of utility or the 
payoff function of each player regarding a specific decision variable. The Nash game, 
definition and equilibrium are used in famous situations such as the Bertrand duopoly 
model, Cornet model of duopoly, the final offer arbitration and the problem of commons 
(Gibbons 2002).
Game theoretic analysis for supply chain networks includes a wide range of research. 
Some scientists have focused on the use of the Nash equilibrium in supply chain co-
ordination by applying a profit sharing contract (Feng et al. 2007; Jiazhen, Qin 2008; 
Feng 2008; Ying et al. 2007; Jaber et al. 2006; Bai, Wang 2008; Xu, Zhong 2011; Liu, 
Zhang 2006; Wang et al. 2009). The other contracts of supply chain coordination are 
presented in Table 1 (Govindan, Nicoleta 2011). 
Besides using coordination contracts, Nash and Stackelberg games also can be used for 
coordinating the SC in complete situations with a determined demand function (Leng, 
Parlar 2010; Arda, Hennet 2005). Besides, Zandi et al. (2012) proposed a strategic theo-
retic approach of a cooperative game to market segmentation. For a symmetric supply 
chain, some researchers gave closed-form expressions of unique equilibrium (Adida, 
Demiguel 2011). In addition, equilibrium for the Shapley value and Eliasberg model 
for coordination and cooperation problems in the SC are performable (Zhao et al. 2010; 
Leng, Zhu 2009). In some cases, while incomplete information on decisions and payoffs 
dominate game conditions, Bayesian – Nash Games are used (Wang, Zhao 2009; Ca-
chon, Lariviere 1999). Other optimization tools such as the queuing theory, a Markov 
chain, backward induction, stochastic programming and a genetic algorithm for solving 
coordination and cooperation problems in the supply chain, mostly in the situations of 
incomplete information games, are also performable (Cachon, Kok 2010; Hennet, Arda 
2008; Stein, Ginevicius 2010; Kaviani et al. 2011; Gupta, Weerawat 2006).
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Table 1. Coordination contracts
DescriptionContract
The buyer pays a fixed and quantity-independent price of each 
purchased unit for the seller Wholesale
Quantity-dependent unit pricesDiscount
The seller promises to compensate the buyer for unsold quantitiesBuyback
The downstream agent commits to return a pre negotiated portion of 
its realized profits to the upstream agentRevenue sharing
The upstream agent rewards the downstream agent for every sold 
unitRebate
Lump-sum monetary transfers among the contracting agents that are 
independent of the amount of trade and used as compensation and 
incentive alignment mechanisms
Side payment
In contrast with a rebate contractFlexible
By increasing the amount of selling or buying, the upstream agent 
proposes a lower pricePush & pull
Considering uncertainty in the game theory approach to solving different dilemmas 
is really noticeable, which eventuates to multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) or 
multi-objective decision making (MODM) usage in the game theory. Therefore, in 2005, 
Peldschus and Zavadskas proposed a Fuzzy matrix game by multi-criteria modelling of 
decision making in engineering projects (Peldschus, Zavadskas 2005). Three years later, 
a new logarithmic normalization method in the game theory was suggested (Zavadskas, 
Turskis 2008). Same time after, an overview of MCDM methods and its application 
to economics based on the game theory was figured by the same authors (Zavadskas, 
Turskis 2011). Recent findings have illustrated the application of the MODM and game 
theory approach where Peldschus and Zavadskas proposed an equilibrium approach 
to construction processes by multi-objective decision making for construction projects 
(Peldschus, Zavadskas 2012). As some of the aforementioned researches indicate, in 
practice, the application of the game theory in the fields of engineering and construction 
has further developed (Zavadskas et al. 2004; Peldschus 2008; Kaplinski, Tamosaitiene 
2010; Peldschus et al. 2010).
This research mainly considers the use and application of the game theory, especially 
non-cooperative Nash games, in supply chain management. In Nash games, all levels of 
the SC or each player in the game act simultaneously with complete information about 
the game, players and equal power. Most of the games used in the SC are non-repetitive, 
with two or finally three levels and limited to one or finally two members at each 
level. Inventory, pricing and marketing policies are included in researches. Our paper 
reflects on inventory with shortage (backlog), incremental production, a nonlinear cost 
production function for the manufacturer, a nonlinear demand function, semi integrated 
(coalition) games and an unlimited supply chain, which differs this research from others. 
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2. Basic model
A three-echelon supply network made of K retailers, M manufacturers and S upstream 
suppliers where K ≥1, M ≥1, S ≥1, (Fig. 1) has been considered. This network produces, 
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Fig. 1. The three-echelon supply network
In this supply network, we assume that all agents are able to decide independently or, 
in some cases, integrate with the agents of other levels of the network. The network fol-
lows a make-to-order pull system in which orders first pass from retailers to manufactur-
ers, and then from manufacturers to suppliers. We assume that all agents have complete 
information. In addition, shortages (and hence stock out) are allowed for manufacturers. 
The cost of shortages will be considered for the manufacturer during a shortage period, 
but no shortage is assumed for retailers and suppliers. Consumer demand for the prod-
uct depends on both the retail price and marketing cost used for product advertisement. 
Following literature (Lee 1993, Esmaeili et al. 2008; Jia et al. 2013), we acknowledge 
a deterministic non-linear form of a consumer demand function as given by (2):
 
. .
n nn r MD k P C
−α β= , (2)
where Dn presents demand for product n, nrP denotes the selling price of product n by 
retailer γ, nMC points to marketing cost for product n ,k a, b,, are all strictly positive con-
stants to represent the corresponding coefficient in the demand function.
The total inventory cost of each manufacturer includes its shortage cost and inventory 
holding cost and it is computable by (3), in which 
nhC stands for holding cost estimated 




λ = − denotes production rate,
nrQ is production quantity, 
Bn represents manufacturer’s shortage, nBC is the cost of manufacturer’s shortage, PCn 
is production capacity provided by the manufacturer (Jia et al. 2013):
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Notice that the model presented in (3) follows literature (Oganezov 2006; Wang, Tang 
2009; Chakrabortty et al. 2010; Chang 2008; Pentico et al. 2009; Jia et al. 2013).
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As a remark, the final retail selling price and retail marketing cost, production quantity 
and shortage quantity, besides the mass production price for the manufacturer, and fi-
nally the raw material price for suppliers are the main decision variables of this research. 
The cost of unit production is nonlinear function .
nP nC u D
−γ=  decreasing in demand and 
having coefficients u > 0, γ > 0 (Bazaraa et al. 1993). Regarding this supply network, 
the scenario when each manufacturer supplies only a specific product to a specific re-
tailer n = r = m is considered. However, upstream suppliers sell their raw materials to 
any manufacturer when needed. This matches the scenario in many industries such as 
fashion apparel in which many retailers (fashion retail brands) have designed garment 
factories (manufacturers) to produce solely for them while since there are relatively few 
upstream suppliers (for fabrics or components such as zippers) in the market, most man-
ufacturers will source from the well-established ones (e.g. YKK is the zipper supplier 
to all kinds of manufacturers and all kinds of retail brands).  Following the standard 
norm discussed in literature, we assume, throughout this paper, that each player at any 
level of the supply network is fully rational. To enhance the presentation, the notation 
employed in Table 2 of this paper is summarized.
Table 2. The notation of decision variables and parameters
NoteDescriptionNoteDescription
rGRetailer’s marginsnOC
Product n and ordering cost of 
supplier s
n
PSelling price of product n to 
retailer rnGManufacturer’s margin
rnsCRetailer’s setup costnTRManufacturer’s total revenue
'
nkRetailer’s holding cost coefficient nTCTotal manufacturing cost
rTRRetailer’s total revenueSGSupplier’s margin
rTCRetailer’s total costSTRSupplier’s total  revenue
rZRetailer’s total payoffSTCSupplier’s total cost
nsk
Coefficient of a raw material in 
product nSG
Supplier’s unit cost of a raw 
material
sPC
Price of a raw material from s of 
product nsS
kSupplier’s holding cost coefficient 
nSCVariable manufacturing costoSCSupplier’s ordering cost
MRZIntegrated payoff function of the manufacturer and retailer
SMZIntegrated payoff function of the manufacturer and supplier
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3. Modelling/payoff functions
This section presents the analytical payoff function for each agent of the supply net-
work. Two different approaches are considered. First, trio players, including suppliers, 
manufacturers and retailers, decide independently without any coordination approach. 
Second, two parts of the SC merge each other and act as one player to confront the 
demonstration of the third party. In both approaches, mathematical models are illustrated 
and the best responses of each player are calculated based on the Nash equilibrium. 
3.1. The payoff function and model of the retailer
For retailer r, it confronts holding and setup costs as well as purchasing cost from get-
ting supply from the manufacturer. In addition, any retailer should have a positive mar-
gin to participate in the supply network. The income of each retailer involves revenue 
achieved by selling the final goods to the final customer. Considering the details above, 
the payoff function of the retailer and a related optimization model are shown in (4) 
(Jaafarnejad et al. 2012; Jia et al. 2013):
 





0, 1, 0 1, 1
n n n n rn nn
n
n n




Max Z k P C P P C C Q Q k P
s t
P P









> α > < β < α −β >  (4)
where the first constraint implies that the final retail selling price is greater than the 
wholesale price paid to the manufacturer, and the second and third constraints guarantee 
that demand should not be negative or greater than production capacity. Decision vari-
ables associated with (4) in the supply network include , , ,
n n nr M n rP C P Q .
3.2. The payoff function and model of the manufacturer
Manufacturer n confronts holding, setup, ordering and shortage costs, purchasing cost 
and production cost. The manufacturer receives revenue with the wholesale price. The 
payoff function of manufacturers and model constraints are shown in (5) where the first 
constraint implies that the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer to the retailer 
is greater than that paid for raw materials and where the second and third constraints 
ensure that demand should not be negative or greater than the available production 
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3.3. The payoff function and model of the supplier
A supplier has to bear holding, setup and purchasing costs. In return, every supplier will 
gain revenue by selling raw materials to manufacturers, and the total revenue depends 
on the amount of respective production used by the manufacturer. By considering the 
above indicated points, the payoff function of the supplier and its constraints are shown 
in (6), where the first constraint implies that the selling price of the raw material to the 
manufacturer should be greater than the procurement cost of acquiring the raw material 
by the supplier, and the second constraint guarantees that demand should not be negative 
(Jaafarnejad et al. 2012; Jia et al. 2013):
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This section proposes that two levels of the SC make a joint venture to confront the 
leadership of the third party. We have considered two integration scenarios: manufac-
turer-retailer and supplier-manufacturer. In the first case, inventory/holding cost issues 
diminish to a single warehouse and the retailer does not have to enforce marketing ef-
fort any more. The second one brings similar benefits. Under each scenario, all parties 
involved simultaneously set their strategies. 




3.4.1. Integration function (M-R Nash game) of the manufacturer – retailer
Our research is aimed at finding the best way of two-agent integration in the supply 
network to achieve the Nash equilibrium with the largest profit. As a remark, it is known 
that strategic partnership in a supply chain is most easily achievable and commonly seen 
in the case between two agents. Multi-agent integration (more than two) is relatively 
rare and usually done by involving a third part supply chain coordinator. In this paper, 
we confine ourselves to two-agent integration as commonly observed in the real world 
and assumed in the mainstream literature. 
To achieve this goal, under our analysis, three options are possible for the three-echelon 
supply network: manufacturer- retailer integration (MR), supplier – manufacturer in-
tegration (SM) and supplier - retailer integration (SR). The purpose of this paper is to 
find the best integration mode among these three. 
By vertically integrating manufacturers with retailers, the number of manufacturers is 
equal to the number of retailers, and the revenue of the MR pair will be the revenue 
generated by the retail selling price for the product sold. The incurred costs will include 
production costs, shortage costs, setup costs and holding costs. We have to notice that 
holding cost at this level includes one warehouse between manufacturers and retail-
ers. In addition, marketing cost will not occur while manufacturers and retailers are 
bonded, because these two members are vertically integrated and simply controlled by 
one level in a centralized manner. A remark that marketing in our research is based on 
the costs the retailer spends to sell product n of the related manufacturer can be made. 
These costs, for example, include allocating a suitable stage in a retailer’s shop for rep-
resenting the product. However, when M and R integrate, this item will be eliminated 
because they act as one. Mathematically, if we make the integrated function of M and 
R, marketing cost write-off from the equation. By considering the above rules, the final 
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Decision variables for this function are , , ,
n Snr n Pr
P Q B C  and constraints insist that de-
mand should not be negative. The objective function maximizes the manufacturer and 
retailer when both act as one player. In this case, the overall income from selling the 
final product to costumers should be maximized while production, holding, stock out 
and purchasing costs should be minimized. As they act as one player, only a single 
warehouse is considered and shared by both for the final products. 
3.4.2. Integration function (S-M Nash game) of the supplier – manufacturer
While suppliers and manufacturers are integrating, their coalition will affect their costs 
and benefits. In this situation, the only income will supply from the mass price from 
manufacturers to retailers. On the other hand, the costs of a new integrated level will 
include production costs, shortage costs, setup costs and holding costs. By considering 
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Decision variables for this function are , , , ,
n nnn n r Mr
P Q B P C and constraints insist that 
demand should not be negative. The objective function maximizes the manufacturer 
and supplier when both act as one player. In this case, the overall income from the sell-
ing product to retailers should be maximized while production, holding, stock out and 
purchasing costs should be minimized.
3.5. Best responses 
Based on the Nash definition of equilibrium, the best responses of each player should be 
estimated by others. As the objective function of each player is a nonlinear mathematical 
model, the best responses of each player, due to its decision variable, are calculated by 
partial differentiation and the first derivative. By considering the best response defini-
tion, continuous and discrete payoff functions, Nash equilibrium N(G) is computable by 
the derivation of utility or the payoff function of each player ( , ) ( , )i i i i iU S S f S S− −=  
regarding a specific decision variable. The best response for the discrete function is 
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3.5.1. Best responses for the decentralized game
Each player in three-level supply chains will make the best decision when playing 
a game in the SC, i.e. they move simultaneously and there is no Stackelberg leader. 
Make a remark that our research is based on non-cooperative game situations; thus, 
in the game theory, orders and demand follow the pull system, but pricing and other 
agreements may not. For example, in Stackelberg games, leadership could happen at 
any level of the SC, which contradicts the pull system. The game theory is a pre-action 
approach and leads the players to order a quantity which maximizes their and other 
levels. While SC information and the demand function are completely accessible, any 
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level enables to model the SC profit function and make the best decision. By considering 
the reasonable behaviour of each player and the Nash best response principle, the best 
decisions on each player in the three-echelon SC will be concluded by the derivation 
of the payoff function to decision variables. The first order condition of each payoff 
function is used for the best response, and the second condition is applied for concavity 
analysis. By calculating the determinant of the Hessian matrix of each player and with 
regard to its decision variables, it has been concluded that all models are concave to 
their decision variables, and therefore optimal solutions to the proposed models are de-
finable. Table 3 represents the best response of each player if the Nash principle is used 
by calculating the first order condition of the payoff functions of each player regarding 
their decision variables. The details of the results presented in the table are mentioned 
in Appendixes 1 to 3.  
3.5.2. Best MR responses
In this situation, two players or two levels of the supply chain are considered, i.e. sup-
pliers and the MR level. Suppliers are similar to the decentralized model with the same 
best response. For a MR Player (it is assumed that MR becomes one unit), by a change 
in the payoff function, the best responses will vary as (17). We have to mention that 
integration affects the relation between manufacturers and retailers; hence, mass price 
from the manufacturer to the retailer as well as marketing cost will be eliminated from 
the final results:  
intjo versusM R S ←→ ←→ 
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3.5.3. Best SM responses
In this case, two players or two levels of the supply chain are taken into account, i.e. 
retailers and the SM level. Retailers are similar to the decentralized model with the same 
best response. For a SM Player, by a change in the payoff function, the best responses 
will vary as (18). We have to mention that integration affects the relation between 
manufacturers and suppliers, and therefore mass price from the supplier to the manu-
facturer will be eliminated from the final results. In all situations, the demand function 
and production rate equality always affect the obtained results:  
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4. Numerical example
With reference to the methodology of our research and to the evaluated results, the 
verification and validation of the investigated outputs have been analysed applying to 
a numerical example of a hypothetical supply chain.  Due to a lack of numerical and 
historical information, the design of the experimental approach has been performed 
to produce suitable data. Each experiment has been assessed by the proposed models, 
and the total profit of the SC has bred out based on coalition or decentralization cir-
cumstances. Following sensitivity analysis, the overall SC profits of each method have 
been compared, and finally, an appropriate approach has been suggested. Through a 
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numerical experiment, 17 design cases (through the performance of experiments) have 
been developed, and the total profit of the supply chain under each scenario has been 
evaluated. Statistical tests on the conducted 17 experiments have disclosed that the 
decentralized system performs significantly worse than the integration of the supplier 
with the manufacturer, whereas no significant difference in other combinations can be 
observed. Jia et al. (2013) used the same numerical example based on the Stackelberg 
game. They considered and compared three types of leadership and concluded that 
retailer leadership would beget the highest profit for the supply chain. Regarding the 
novelty of our research consisting of channel integration and the best responses of the 
proposed coalition, the above mentioned numerical example has been solved by our new 
non-cooperative game theory approach and coalition vs. decentralization. Conclusively, 
the profit achieved from the coalition was higher than employing decentralization and 
leadership methods. 
4.1. Definition of the problem 
Considering the above mentioned models for sensitivity analysis and leadership selec-
tion, the three-echelon supply chain, including 2 suppliers, 2 manufacturers and 2 retail-
ers has been designed. Table 4 indicates the numerical amounts of parameters proposed 
in the supply chain.
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For sensitivity analysis, five constants, including a, b, g, k, u, have been chosen. The 
lower and upper bounds of these five elements are shown in Table 5.







While using design of experiment (DOE) and 2k p− experiments, and including one 
central point in each block, 17 different tests have been designed employing MINITAB 
16.5 software (see Table 6).




















All experiments designed in Table 5 are performed for the decentralization game, MR 
game and SM game. For the decentralized game, the models have been coded, debugged 
and solved by LINGO 11. On the other hand, for MR and SM games, multi nonlinear 
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equations have been solved using the Levenberg – Marquardt algorithm through fsolve 
application in MATLAB software. The calculated overall profit of the supply chain tak-
ing into account different types of problems is displayed in Table 7. 



















By taking a two-paired test, the results of the three types of decision making used in 
the supply chain have been compared. The findings obtained employing MINITAB 
16.5 software is presented in Table 8. It is obvious that coalition, integration and semi 
centralization bring better results and profit to the SC. 
Table 8. Comparison results from three coalition and independent games
Paired T test typeGame typeExperimentsMeanSt DevT-ValueP-Value
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The main effects of each situation considering five critical elements are calculated using 
MINITAB 16.5 software and shown in the figures of Table 9. In all models, Gama has 
the least noticeable effect, whereas K, Alpha and Beta have the strongest one, which 
means that changes in unit production cost will impact SC profit less than demand os-
cillation. K and Beta directly affect the overall profit of the SC in all three situations, 
and Alpha makes an impact inversely on decentralized and SM games. In the MR semi-
integrated game, U parameter has direct effects on the overall profit of the SC. Thus, 
it can be concluded that higher marketing cost increases SC profit as a lower retailer 
price do for decentralized and SM games. Also, Beta parameter does not exist in the 
MR game, and therefore marketing cost is not included. As Beta parameter does not 
exist in the MR game, marketing cost is not included. We also conclude that changes 
in unit production cost will impact SC profit less than demand oscillation. In addition, 
higher marketing cost increases SC profit as a lower retailer price does for decentral-
ized and SM games.
Conclusions
The conducted research has demonstrated coordination in multi-echelon supply chains 
in which the non-cooperative game theory approach is used as a suitable tool for coordi-
nating pricing, inventory and marketing expenditure policies in the unlimited three-level 
supply chain, since a different level acts independently (decentralization) or, in some 
cases, integrates with other levels (coalition). For this matter, first of all, the objective 
function of each player and constraints has been modelled. Next, the best response 
of each player has been obtained based on the definition of the Nash equilibrium. Fi-
nally, two scenarios of decentralization and coalition have been modelled and analysed 
conducting an experiment. Among this, the concavities of the proposed models have 
been obtained and sensitivity analyses for different situation have been illustrated. A 
remark that a nonlinear demand and production cost function, besides unlimited levels 
and stock out situation taking into account the inventory system of the manufacturer, 
has been considered. Through the numerical experiment, 17 design cases (performed 
experiments) have been developed and the total profit of the supply chain under each 
scenario has been evaluated. According to statistical tests on the above introduced 17 
experiments, the authors have found that the decentralized system performs significantly 
worse than the integration of the supplier with the manufacturer, whereas no significant 
difference can be observed for other combinations. To sum up, coalition and semi in-
tegration circumstances are more effective and beget higher profit for the total supply 
chain. In addition, based on the considered SC, coalition between manufacturers with 
suppliers is more effective than that between retailers and manufacturers. 
The above discussed situation and assumptions made in this paper are the keys for fu-
ture researches. Taking into account more levels in the supply chain through distribution 
centres, warehouses or final stores will lead researchers to a comprehensive model for 
coordinating the supply chain in the future. For more accuracy and to provide the pro-
posed models performable in reality and industrial situations, the case studies based on 
industrial information from the existing supply chains should be gathered and examined. 
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In conclusion, as the competency of information and complete information shared at dif-
ferent levels of the supply chain under real circumstances seem to be impossible, using 
incomplete or imperfect game theory approaches such as the signalling game or Nash 
Bayesian game will solve this problem and reach more realistic options in the future. 
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